The Problem of Affective Nihilism in Nietzsche (2020)
https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783030371326
Nietzsche is perhaps best known for his diagnosis of the problem of nihilism. Though his elaborations on this diagnosis often include descriptions of certain beliefs characteristic of the nihilist (such as beliefs in the meaninglessness or worthlessness of existence), he just as frequently specifies a variety of affective symptoms experienced by the nihilist that weaken their will and diminish their agency. This psychological dimension to nihilism, however, remains drastically underexplored. In this book, I offer a comprehensive account of affective nihilism that draws on Nietzsche’s drive psychology, especially his reflections on affects and their transformative potential. After exploring Nietzsche’s account of affectivity and the phenomenon of affective nihilism, I argue that affective nihilism might be overcome by employing a variety of Nietzschean strategies: experimentation, self-narration, and self-genealogy.
Paperback edition published in June 2021.
https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783030371326
Nietzsche is perhaps best known for his diagnosis of the problem of nihilism. Though his elaborations on this diagnosis often include descriptions of certain beliefs characteristic of the nihilist (such as beliefs in the meaninglessness or worthlessness of existence), he just as frequently specifies a variety of affective symptoms experienced by the nihilist that weaken their will and diminish their agency. This psychological dimension to nihilism, however, remains drastically underexplored. In this book, I offer a comprehensive account of affective nihilism that draws on Nietzsche’s drive psychology, especially his reflections on affects and their transformative potential. After exploring Nietzsche’s account of affectivity and the phenomenon of affective nihilism, I argue that affective nihilism might be overcome by employing a variety of Nietzschean strategies: experimentation, self-narration, and self-genealogy.
Paperback edition published in June 2021.
Selected Papers
"Morality and Feeling Powerful: Nietzsche's Power-based Sentimental Pragmatism" in Inquiry. Online-first access. (2023)
In recent work, Bernard Reginster argues for an interpretation of the relationship between morality and the affects in Nietzsche which he calls 'sentimental pragmatism'. According to this view, the values, value judgments, and moral practices agents develop and adopt function to serve specific emotional needs. Reginster deploys this interpretation to argue for a functional interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, according to which all three essays of the Genealogy comprise psychological studies designed to uncover Christian morality’s function to serve the affect of ressentiment. In this paper, I first develop Reginster’s sentimental pragmatism by specifying a need to feel powerful as the one emotional need which all moral developments aim to serve on Nietzsche’s view. Then, I argue that while Reginster’s functional interpretation of the Genealogy makes sense of key moral phenomena discussed in the first and third essays, it works less well to explain key developments in the second essay. I then suggest that my power-based sentimental pragmatism does better in this regard, allowing us to identify one basic function of morality that Nietzsche intends to uncover in all three essays of the Genealogy, one basic emotional need it aims to serve: the need to feel empowered.
"Nietzsche on the Sociality of Emotional Experience" in the European Journal of Philosophy. Online-first access. (2022)
In this paper, I explore the sociality of emotional experience in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Specifically, I describe four key mechanisms through which an individual’s sociocultural context shapes her emotional experience on Nietzsche’s view—emotional contagion as habitual affective mimicry, the production of emotions’ felt character through the assimilation of dominant social beliefs and norms, affective interpretation à la Christopher Fowles, and the imposition of dominant notions of emotional appropriateness—fleshing out a dimension of Nietzsche’s thought which is largely taken for granted but remains undertreated. After detailing these mechanisms, I argue that attending to the sociality of emotional experience in Nietzsche’s thought is crucial not only for understanding key elements of his moral psychology (including certain of his reflections on freedom and self-transformation), but also for understanding his interpretation of nihilism as a psychological-affective phenomenon produced by the society to which one belongs. On Nietzsche’s view, attending to the sociality of emotion helps individuals recognize the way in which the sociocultural contexts they inhabit might undermine their flourishing—and also helps them envision the conditions (especially sociocultural conditions) requisite for healthier, more empowering emotional lives.
"Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect: Overcoming Affective Nihilism" in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Volume 50, Issue 2. (2019)
After briefly re-introducing the problem of affective nihilism in Nietzsche and detailing a variety of its forms, I identify and investigate potential Nietzschean strategies for jump- starting the agency of the affective nihilist and overcoming affective nihilism. By attending to Nietzsche’s own practices and recommendations, I locate strategies that might enable the affective nihilist to will and, eventually, to transform herself. The two strategies I investigate include 1) “living experimentally” by placing oneself in a variety of potentially stimulating climates and contexts and 2) undertaking particular practices of self-knowledge, especially the formation and reflection upon a personal narrative. Both of these strategies employ the production of affect in an individual to potentially energize one’s will and stimulate one’s drives.
"On the Problem of Affective Nihilism" in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Volume 49, Issue 1. (2018)
Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a "philosophical claim." This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster's characterization presents nihilism as a purely cognitive phenomenon, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a feeling-based phenomenon, a weariness with one's world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche's reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche's account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism.
"Environmental Nihilism: Reading Nietzsche against New Conservationism" in Environmental Philosophy. Volume 17, Issue 2. (2017)
This paper presents David E. Storey’s foundation of an environmental ethic on Nietzsche’s philosophy of life in Naturalizing Heidegger as a version of new conservationism. Critically examining Storey’s various claims, this paper demonstrates potentially problematic aspects of the new conservationist project. In order to both question Storey’s interpretation of a Nietzschean philosophy of life and problematize the new conservationist understanding of nature, this paper returns to the work of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. In particular, it argues from a Nietzschean perspective that the new conservationist projection of human teleology and values onto wild nature and non-human life results in a nihilistic conception of wild nature.
In recent work, Bernard Reginster argues for an interpretation of the relationship between morality and the affects in Nietzsche which he calls 'sentimental pragmatism'. According to this view, the values, value judgments, and moral practices agents develop and adopt function to serve specific emotional needs. Reginster deploys this interpretation to argue for a functional interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, according to which all three essays of the Genealogy comprise psychological studies designed to uncover Christian morality’s function to serve the affect of ressentiment. In this paper, I first develop Reginster’s sentimental pragmatism by specifying a need to feel powerful as the one emotional need which all moral developments aim to serve on Nietzsche’s view. Then, I argue that while Reginster’s functional interpretation of the Genealogy makes sense of key moral phenomena discussed in the first and third essays, it works less well to explain key developments in the second essay. I then suggest that my power-based sentimental pragmatism does better in this regard, allowing us to identify one basic function of morality that Nietzsche intends to uncover in all three essays of the Genealogy, one basic emotional need it aims to serve: the need to feel empowered.
"Nietzsche on the Sociality of Emotional Experience" in the European Journal of Philosophy. Online-first access. (2022)
In this paper, I explore the sociality of emotional experience in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Specifically, I describe four key mechanisms through which an individual’s sociocultural context shapes her emotional experience on Nietzsche’s view—emotional contagion as habitual affective mimicry, the production of emotions’ felt character through the assimilation of dominant social beliefs and norms, affective interpretation à la Christopher Fowles, and the imposition of dominant notions of emotional appropriateness—fleshing out a dimension of Nietzsche’s thought which is largely taken for granted but remains undertreated. After detailing these mechanisms, I argue that attending to the sociality of emotional experience in Nietzsche’s thought is crucial not only for understanding key elements of his moral psychology (including certain of his reflections on freedom and self-transformation), but also for understanding his interpretation of nihilism as a psychological-affective phenomenon produced by the society to which one belongs. On Nietzsche’s view, attending to the sociality of emotion helps individuals recognize the way in which the sociocultural contexts they inhabit might undermine their flourishing—and also helps them envision the conditions (especially sociocultural conditions) requisite for healthier, more empowering emotional lives.
"Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect: Overcoming Affective Nihilism" in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Volume 50, Issue 2. (2019)
After briefly re-introducing the problem of affective nihilism in Nietzsche and detailing a variety of its forms, I identify and investigate potential Nietzschean strategies for jump- starting the agency of the affective nihilist and overcoming affective nihilism. By attending to Nietzsche’s own practices and recommendations, I locate strategies that might enable the affective nihilist to will and, eventually, to transform herself. The two strategies I investigate include 1) “living experimentally” by placing oneself in a variety of potentially stimulating climates and contexts and 2) undertaking particular practices of self-knowledge, especially the formation and reflection upon a personal narrative. Both of these strategies employ the production of affect in an individual to potentially energize one’s will and stimulate one’s drives.
"On the Problem of Affective Nihilism" in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Volume 49, Issue 1. (2018)
Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a "philosophical claim." This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster's characterization presents nihilism as a purely cognitive phenomenon, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a feeling-based phenomenon, a weariness with one's world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche's reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche's account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism.
"Environmental Nihilism: Reading Nietzsche against New Conservationism" in Environmental Philosophy. Volume 17, Issue 2. (2017)
This paper presents David E. Storey’s foundation of an environmental ethic on Nietzsche’s philosophy of life in Naturalizing Heidegger as a version of new conservationism. Critically examining Storey’s various claims, this paper demonstrates potentially problematic aspects of the new conservationist project. In order to both question Storey’s interpretation of a Nietzschean philosophy of life and problematize the new conservationist understanding of nature, this paper returns to the work of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. In particular, it argues from a Nietzschean perspective that the new conservationist projection of human teleology and values onto wild nature and non-human life results in a nihilistic conception of wild nature.